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I. INTRODUCTION
We are talking about people's lives, not the indifference of some
cost accountants. We are talking about assuring the men and women who work in our plants and factories that they will go home
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after a day's work with their bodies intact.'
In the 1970's employees were given a new right-the enforceable
right to a safe place to work.' The right to safe employment is not
a new concept, but one which has been embedded in the common
law for years.3 It is, however, a right which was long unenforced in
American courts. Although American jurisprudence previously had
recognized the common law and state statutory measures designed
to achieve the goal of workplace safety, the opinions were often
idle words with little attendant enforcement." Not until 1976 did
an American court hold the employer accountable to his common
law duty to provide reasonably safe employment.5 Prior to that
time the "what is good for big business is good for America" philosophy left employees' rights at the wayside,' while employers
were given a free hand to industrialize America at the expense of
the lives of the American working class.
The employee's right to safety and health emanates from the
employment contract.7 As in the "social contract" theory of government,' the employment contract is a trade-off of man's natural
rights for the common good. As man combined forces to form society and government, he joined hands to form economic enterprises

1. 116 Cong. Rec. 37625 (1970) (Senator Ralph Yarborough); Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 n.16, (1980). Senator Ralph Yarborough was a sponsor of the Senate
Bill on the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Id. at 11 n.16.
2. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652-78 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act) (designed to
assure every working man safe and healthful working conditions).
3. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 444-45 (1977) (state statutory and common law remedies inadequate).
5. Note, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1074, 1081 (1977); Shrimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.
was the first judicial recognition of the common law right to compel an employer to eliminate unsafe work conditions. See Shrimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 411
(N.J. Ch. 1976).
6. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 223 (1952) (author notes "the desire of judges to encourage industrial enterprise by
making the burdens as light as possible.")
7. See Pioneer Cas. Co. v. Bush, 457 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see also Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F. Supp. 127, 129 (S.D. Tex.
1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1970).
8. For a discussion of the social contract of government, see, J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1762); J. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of
Government, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II (1690).
9. See J. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Government, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II at 85 (1690).
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which resulted in the employment relationship. Man gave up his
right to toil independently for himself and instead began to work
conjunctively with others. In this respect, the employee gave up
some of his individual rights and freedoms in exchange for the security of the employment position.10 The employer, alternatively,
has also accepted the duty to protect the rights and freedoms retained by the employee. One such right retained by the employee
is the right to good health and safety, lead the common law to recognize the duty of the employer to guard his employees against
needless injuries and to provide reasonably safe employment
conditions."
This article will examine the common law and statutory rights of
the employee to workplace safety in the industrialized America of
the 1980's.
II.

COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY RIGHT

To A SAFE PLACE To

WORK

One area of concern to the employee when entering the employment contract is working conditions, and more particularly,
whether the employment site is free from unreasonable risk of
harm to life or limb. Although it may be said the employee assumes the condition of the worksite by accepting a position with a
particular employer, the employee does not assume the risk of bod12
ily injury.
As noted, when the employee enters into the employment contract he gives up some of his personal rights in exchange for compensation from the employer. The right to be free from unreasonable bodily injury, however, is an inalienable right and, therefore, is
10. Some of the rights and freedoms given up by the employee in accepting the employment position include: the method and manner of performing the work; the time and place
for performing the work; and, most significantly, the independence he surrenders by becoming subject to the control of the employer. See Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 151, 155
(D.D.C. 1965) (factors for determining employer-employee relationship); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 460 (4th ed. 1971) (elements of servant-independent servant
relationship).
11. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975).
12. Even the employee cannot contract away the employer's liability under the employment contract. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Gravit, 551 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1472, at
592 (1961).
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not given up by the employee in exchange for the job. Rather, the
employer, by hiring the employee, assumes the duty to protect his
employee from injury or death."3
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, legally enforceable duties
arise in two fashions: in contract or in tort.14 Because of the common origin of modern tort and contract law,"5 the legally recognized duties of the employer to the employee regarding worksite
safety are interchangeably referred to as warranty and negligence.16 At common law, the employer was not an insurer of the
employee's safety.17 The employer, however, assumed the obligation to protect his employees from perils and hazards within his
control.' 8 The employer's duties include the duty to warn employees as to hazards of their work and to supervise their activities, the
duty to furnish a reasonably safe place in which to labor, and the
13. See, e.g., Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M. Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567,
568 (Tex. 1972). In Hough, the Supreme Court explained this duty as:
[T]he obligation of the master, whether a natural person or corporate body, not to
expose the servant, when conducting the master's business, to perils or hazards
against which he may be guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master. To
that end the master is bound to observe all care which prudence and exigencies of the
situation require, in providing the servant with machinery or instrumentalities adequately safe for use by the latter.
Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879).
14. See L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1 (2d ed. 1965) (a contract
is an obligation which the law will enforce); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
4 (4th ed. 1971) (torts consist of breaches of duties imposed upon parties by the law).
15. E.g. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 637-46 (5th ed. 1956)
(contract action of assumpsit developed from tort action of trespass).
16. Cf. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217-20 (1879) (cases cited by Supreme
Court refer to breaches of employers' duty as negligence or breach of warranty,
interchangeably).
17. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern. R.R. v. Carrol, 280 U.S. 491, 496 (1930);
Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. v. Smith, 206 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1953); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Martin, 363 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tex. 1962). For a discussion on how
modern worker's compensation statutes have changed this common law rule, see the section
on worker's compenstion, infra.
18. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); see, e.g., Farley v. M M Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567,
568 (Tex. 1972); Frontier Theatres, Inc. v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 360, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963). In FrontierTheatres, Inc.
v. Brown, the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals held that an employer owes an employee on
the employer's premises in the scope of his employment, that any owner or possessor of
similar premises owes to a business invitee. See Frontier Theatres, Inc. v. Brown, 362
S.W.2d 360, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 369 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. 1963); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 497b (1948 Supp.).
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duty to furnish reasonably safe instrumentalities with which employees are to work.' " The employer is liable for any injury resulting from the breach of any of these duties.' 0
At common law, under the employment contract the employee
risks dangers which ordinarily attend or are incidental to the business in which he voluntarily engages." These are risks which the
employee himself is presumed to be better able to prevent, such as
careless or dangerous work habits of fellow servants with whom he
has had an opportunity to become acquainted." The employee,
however, is not presumed to risk the negligence of his employer in
failing to carry out the duty to provide the employee with a safe
place to work free from perils and hazards within the employers
control. 2" At common law, the employer was liable for his negligent
activity2" and that of those under his control,'2 but was not respon-

sible for injuries resulting from activities beyond his control or
which occurred despite his exercise of due care.
With the growth of the modern industrial society, many legislatures have passed statutory legislation designed to protect the
working man from hazardous working conditions.' In 1967 the
19. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975); see Hough v. Railway
Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879).
20. See, e.g., Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 754-55 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d
567, 568-70 (Tex. 1972).
21. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879).
22. See id. at 217. For a discussion on the fellow servant doctrine, see the section on
employee's right to compensation for injury, infra.
23. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879). In Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975), the Texas Supreme Court expressly held that volenti non fit
injuria (assumption of the risk) is not a defense to an employer's negligent acts. Thus, the
mere fact that an employee accepted the work task is no defense to injuries resulting from
the employer's negligence. Id. at 758.
24. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Cabrera v. Delta Brands, Inc.,
538 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. See, e.g., Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 219, (1879) (master liable for acts of
agents); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. 1975) (master liable for failure
of foreman to supervise); Medlin Milling Co. v. Bootwell, 133 S.W. 1042, 1043 (Tex. 1911)
(employer liable for danger known to him even though caused by strangers).
26. The employer was not an insurer at common law. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio
Southwestern R.R. v. Carrol, 280 U.S. 491, 496 (1930); Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. v.
Smith, 206 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1953); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Martin, 363
S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tex. 1962).
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78(1976) (Occupational Safety and Health Act); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5173-78 (Texas Health Safety and Morals Act); (Vernon Pamp.
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Texas Legislature passed the Occupational Safety Act,2 8 which
"declared the policy of the State of Texas to protect the health
and welfare of the people. . . by protecting working men and women against unsafe and hazardous working conditions and by encouraging correction of any such working conditions that may exist
in industry and enterprise.""9 The Texas Legislature created the
Occupational Safety Board for the purpose of administering the
Act. 0 Section 3 of the Occupational Safety Act prescribes the duties of employers, Subdivision (a) provides :
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and a place
of employment reasonably safe and healthful for employees. Every
employer shall install, maintain, and use such methods, processes,
devices, and safeguards, including methods of sanitation and hygiene, as are reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and
safety of such employees, and shall do every other thing reasonably
necessary to render safe such employment and place of
employment."1

Subdivision (b) of section 3 enables the Occupational Safety Board
to make rules in accordance with the policy of the Act. 2 In recent
years the state legislature has failed to fund the Occupational
Supp. 1971-1981); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5182a (Texas Occupational Safety Act)
(Vernon 1971).
28. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5182a (Vernon 1971).
29. Id. art. 5182a, § 1.
30. Id. art. 5182a, § 4.
31. Id. art. 5182a, § 3(a); see Cabrera v. Delta Brands, Inc., 538 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Cabrera v. Delta Brands, Inc., the only
reported decision under the Occupational Safety Act, the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals
stated:
It is a primary, continuing and non-delegable duty of the employer to provide a safe
place and conditions in which his employees may work. . . . As a part of this obligation the employer must instruct his employees in the safe use and handling of the
products and equipment used in and around the employer's plant or facilities....
One of the reasons for placing this burden on the employer is because the employer
usually has greater knowledge or should have greater knowledge of the dangers and
risks of injuries to the employee.
Cabrera v. Delta Brands, Inc., 538 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
32. See also, T.x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5182a § 8(a) (Vernon 1971). Section 3(b)
states that the rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety Board are binding upon employes, whereas section 8 enables the Board to promulgate rules. See id. art. 5182a §§ 3(b),
8.
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Safety Division. As a result, the regulations are rarely enforced.3 3
The Texas Legislature has also passed the Health, Safety and
Morals Act." This Act regulates the temperature and humidity, 5
odors and dust," cleaning,8 7 exits and handrails," toilets,3 ' and immoral influences "° of the worksite. The Health, Safety and Morals
Act enables the Commissioner of Labor Statistics or any one of his
deputies to inspect the worksite, and upon finding a violation, issue a written order mandating the correction of the unsafe condition.4 ' The failure to comply with the Commissioner's order may
subject the employer to fines or imprisonment. 42 Although the Protection of Health, Safety and Morals Act is still in existence, its
effectiveness has been largely superseded by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.43
In 1970, the United States Congress passed the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 4 4 (OSHA), an extensive act designed to "as33. Telephone interview with Marion Jones, Chief Safety Engineer of the Occupational
Safety Division, Texas Health Department (May 21, 1980). Mr. Jones stated that while the
Occupational Safety Act is still technically in effect, the state of Texas has provided no
funds, and, therefore, the regulations are no longer enforced. The Occupational Safety Division, however, does receive federal funds from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. With these funds the Occupational Safety Division advises employers within the
state of Texas on applicable federal regulations. Mr. Jones stated that the federal government may, in prosecuting a safety violation, use a state standard, such as those promulgated
under the Texas Occupational Safety Act.
34. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5173-80 (Vernon 1971).
35. Id. art. 5173.
36. Id. art. 5174.
37. Id. art. 5175.
38. Id. art. 5176.
39. Id. art. 5177.
40. Id. art. 5178.
41. Id. art. 5179.
42. Id. arts. 5178a, 5179a (Vernon Supp. 1979). These statutes provide that the employer may be fined not less than $25 nor more than $200 and/or sentenced to up to 60 days
in jail. See id. arts. 5178a, 5179a. Compared to the available penalties under current federal
law, it is easy to see why the state safety acts were not effective. See Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1977) (state statutory remedies inadequate to protect employee from death or injury).
43. See TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-911 (1976) (to extent promulgated, OSHA supersedes arts. 7173 to 5180, 5182). Mr. Kosta stated that since 1976 no money has been funded
for the enforcement of the Health, Safety and Morals Act. There are, however, certain areas
(such as bathrooms in mines) which are not regulated by the federal government, and remain, technically within the jurisdiction of this Act. Telephone interview with Larry Kosta,
Director of Labor Law Division, Texas Department of Labor and Standards (May 22, 1980).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976).
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sure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 4 Section 5 of the Act
states that it is the duty of each employer to furnish "each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards which are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees."4 Section 6 of OSHA expressly
enables the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards with the
intent to improve safety or health.' 7 Under this authority, the Secretary of Labor has enacted several hundred regulations intended
to assure that no person's life is needlessly put in risk of harm.' 8
OSHA, as well as its state predecessors, are prophylactic measures designed to prevent workplace injuries by assuring that the
worksite is safe and healthy. 4' This is in contrast to worker's compensation statutes which are designed to compensate the employee
for the injury which has already occurred. 50 Thus, from the common law right to a safe place to work there arose two statutory
means for preserving that right, the prophylactic rights designed to
prevent the injury, and the compensatory rights to relief upon injury. Within the first category, the prophylactic rights of the employee, there are two major areas of concern today: the employee's
45. See id. § 651. The purpose of OSHA is clearly set out in section 651 of the Act. See
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976)(known as general duty clause); see Champlin Petroleum Co.
v. Occupational Safety and Heaith Review Comm'n, 593 F.2d 637, 639 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 657 (1976); see Bloomfield Mechanical
Contr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1257, 1263 (3rd
Cir. 1975); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 124
(5th Cir. 1974); the standards are presently listed in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-90 (1981).
48. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928 (1981).
49. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1980); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1977). The Atlas Court
explained the purpose and need for OSHA as follows:
After extensive investigation, Congress concluded, in 1970, that work-related deaths
and injuries had become a drastic national problem. Finding the existing state statutory remedies as well as state common-law actions for negligence and wrongful death
to be inadequate to protect the employee population from death and injury due to
unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 ....
The Act created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining unsafe or
unhealthy working conditions, and empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
health and safety standards.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-45
(1977) (footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-355 (West 1972); N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW
§§ 1-402 (McKinneys 1965); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-09 (Vernon 1967).
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right to have the worksite inspected 1 and the right of the employee to strike unsafe work areas. 2
III. PROPHYLACTIC RIGHTS
A.

The Employee's Right To Have The Worksite Inspected

The design of the OSHA is to prevent workplace injuries by assuring that the place of employment is free from recognized
hazards likely to cause physical injury.58 To this end, Congress
passed section 8(a) of the Act which provides:
In order to carry out the purpose of this Act, the Secretary [of Labor], upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant establishment, construction site, or other area,
workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and, investigate during regular working hours
and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits
and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment
and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus,
devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or
employee.8 '
Section 8(0(1) of the Act prescribes that any employee or his
representative may petition the Secretary of Labor for the inspection of the worksite. 65 The petition must be in writing and must
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(a), (f) (1976).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981) (OSHA).
53. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654 (1976).
54. Id. § 657(a); see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1978). In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the United States Supreme Court read section 8(a) of OSHA to require, in the absence of consent, a search warrant to inspect the employer's premises. The
administrative search warrant may be issued upon a less stringent probable cause than the
traditional warrant in a criminal action. Probable cause for an administrative search may be
based upon specific evidence of a violation such as the notice of an employee under section
8(f), or by showing that the reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular investigation. See Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal; see also 29 U.S.C. 657(a) (1976).
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976); see also Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9,
(1980).
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set forth reasonable grounds for the inspection." Upon receiving a
request for inspection predicated upon reasonable belief that an
imminent danger is present in a workplace, OSHA mandates an
inspection. If the Secretary, however, determines that there are
no reasonable grounds to believe that a violation exists, he must
notify the employee in writing that his request for an inspection
has been denied. 8
In order to protect the employee's right to request the inspection
of unsafe workareas, Congress passed section 11(c) of the Act.9
This provision provides that no employee may be discharged or
otherwise discriminated against because he has filed a complaint or
otherwise exercised any right afforded under the Act. 0 Additionally, the names of employees who provide information" or who
make complaints are protected from disclosure under the in-

56. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1976).
57. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9-10, (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976). It
should be noted that the code provides: "If upon receipt of such notification the Secretary
determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, he
shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as
practicable, to determine if such violation or danger exists," whereas the Supreme Court's
interpretation of this provision states that the Secretary must make an inspection. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(f) (1976) (emphasis added). Compare Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9-10,
(1980) (must inspect) with 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976) (shall inspect).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976). If the request for inspection has been denied, the employees' rights appear to be limited to refiling a more detailed request, or in the most drastic
situations, filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to undertake an inspection. If the circumstances warrant, the employee may be justified in refusing
to work in the hazardous workarea.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976). See Whirlpool Corp. V. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10 (1980);
Stephenson Enter. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1978); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(1976). Subsection (1) of section 11(c) states:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself
or other of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976); See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1980).
60. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
61. Employees can provide information in two ways: first, by requesting inspection or
otherwise giving notice prior to the inspection, see 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976); and secondly, by accompanying the inspector or otherwise talking to him during the inspection, see
id. §§ 657(e), (f)(2). The employee is protected under the informer's privilege in either case.
See Stephenson Enter. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021, 1025 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); see also 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
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former's privilege.6 2 During the course of the inspection, a representative of the employees is permitted to accompany the OSHA
inspector." Additionally, any employee, not merely the employee
representative, is permitted to notify the inspector of any violation
of the Act which he has reason to believe exists in such workplace. 4 Since the inspection must occur at reasonable times during
working hours,6" and a reasonable number of employees or an employee representative are to accompany the inspector upon his inspection,6 6 it logically appears to be within the mandate of section
11(c)67 that such employees are entitled to be compensated for the
time spent on the inspection tour.6

62. See Stephenson Enter. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1978). The
informer's privilege is a judicially constructed privilege to protect the anonymity of the informant. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 52, 59 (1957). Although the privilege generally protects only the identity of the informant, where the contents of the communication
may tend to reveal the informant's identity, the communication is likewise protected. See
id. at 60.
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1976). This provision provides that both the employer and
the employees are entitled to have a representative accompany the OSHA inspector during
the physical inspection of the workplace. See id. In Accu-Namics, Inc. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Commission, 515 F. 2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903
(1976), the Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit held the failure of the OSHA Inspector to
immediately identify himself and provide a walkaround opportunity to representatives of
the employer and employees would not result in the exclusion of evidence obtained on such
an inspection of the premises in the absence of a showing of prejudice. See id. at 833; see
also Marshall v. Western Waterproofing Co., 560 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1977); Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 535 F.2d 371, 375-76
(7th Cir. 1976).
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(2) (1976).
65. See id. §§ 657(a)(1), (2).
66. See id. § 657(e).
67. Id. § 660(c).
68. Section 11(c) of OSHA states no employee shall be discharged or otherwise discriminated against because of the exercise of any right afforded by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1)
(1976). See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 (1980). Since the employee has the
right to accompany the OSHA inspector during the inspection which must occur during
regular working hours, it appears to be inconsistent with the intent of the Act to deny the
employee compensation while accompanying the inspector. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(a), (e)
(1976)with id. §§ 651, 660(c)(1). Although most employers pay their employees for time
spent by them in participating in walkaround inspections, some do not. See Leone v. Mobile
Oil Co., 523 F.2d 1153, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Leone, however, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that it is not mandatory for the employer to compensate for time
spent on the inspection. This position, however, appears to be contrary to the mandate of
section 11(c) (1) of the Act, since it tends to discriminate against employees who accompany
the inspector.
In 1977, Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), a companion
act to OSHA. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. III 1979). Section 813 of MSHA parallels
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When an OSHA inspection reveals a violation of the Act, 9 the
Secretary of Labor may issue a citation for the alleged violation, fix
a reasonable time for the abatement of the dangerous condition,
and propose a penalty. 70 The employer, however, may contest the
citation and proposed penalty,71 and should he do so, the effective
date of the abatement order is postponed until the completion of
all administrative proceedings. 7 2 Since these proceedings may include a hearing before an administrative judge and an appeal to
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 7 3 the actual abatement of the hazard may be delayed for some time.74 If,

however, the inspection reveals that workplace conditions or practices are expected to cause death or bodily harm, the OSHA inspector must inform the affected employees and the employer of
the danger.75 The Secretary of Labor can then petition a federal
court to enjoin or otherwise restrain the conditions or practices
giving rise to the imminent danger.7 6 If the Secretary of Labor declines to seek injunctive relief, an affected employee is given the
right to compel the Secretary to act." There may arise, however,
the occasion where the administrative procedures of OSHA may
not be swift enough to prevent the injuries; in such cases the affected employees may be able to invoke their self-help right to
section 8 of OSHA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976) (OSHA inspections) with 30 U.S.C. §
813 (Supp. III 1979) (MSHA inspections). Section 813(0 of MSHA expressly states that the
"representative of miners who is also an employee of the operator shall suffer no loss of pay
during the period of his participation in the inspection." 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (Supp. III 1979).
There appears to be no logical reason to make a distinction between OSHA and MSHA
inspections with reference to the right of the accompanying employee to be paid.
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-90 (1981).
70. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1980); 29 U.S.C. §§ 658(a),
659(a), 666 (1976).
71. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 n.l (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 659(a), (c)
(1976).
72. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1980); 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(b),
666(d) (1976).
73. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1980); 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c),
661(i) (1976).
74. See Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
75. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1976).
76. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
77. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976).
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"strike" unsafe work areas.7 This right becomes even more important as funds are cut reducing the inspection of industrial
workareas.
B.

The Right Of The Employee to Strike Unsafe Workareas

In Whirlpool Corporation v. Marshall,7 9 the United States Supreme Court held an employee faced with the choice between not
performing the assigned task or subjecting himself to injury or
death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace, the employee may not be discharged or discriminated, against because of
his refusal to perform the assigned task.8 0 Although this right has
been dubbed a right to "strike,"8 1 the Labor Management Relations Act clearly explains that the avoidance of abnormally dangerous working conditions is not a strike."'
The right to avoid unsafe workareas arises from three separate
legislative acts: the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),83

the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 84 and OSHA.8" To completely understand the scope of this right it is necessary to probe
each act individually.

78. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
79. 445 U.S. 1, (1980).
80. See id. at 4; accord, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17
(1962); Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (3rd
Cir. 1975); Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 510 F.2d
1075, 1078-80 (6th Cir. 1975); see, e.g., Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753,
757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385
(1974); 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
81. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). The term "strike" comes
from the Daniel's bill to OSHA, dubbed the "strike with pay provision." See id. at 16.
82. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.29 (1980); Gateway Coal
Co. V. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974); 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
84. See id. § 157.
85. See id. §§ 655, 657(g)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981). More precisely, the provision enabling the employee to avoid hazardous workareas was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor (see 29 C.R.F. § 1977.12 (1981)), under his rule making authority expressly
authorized by Congress in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. §§
655, 657(g)(2) (1976)). In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court
upheld this regulation as a proper exercise of the Secretary's authority under OSHA. Id. at
4. See also Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 755-57 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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1. Labor Management Relations Act
Section 502 of the LMRA provides in pertinent part that:
shall be construed to require an individual

Nothing in this Act ...

employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall
anything in this Act.

.

. be construed to make the quitting of his

labor by an individual employee an illegal act; nor shall any court
issue any process to compel the performance by an individual employee of such labor or service without his consent; nor shall the
quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike."

The right to walk-off the job site under section 502 requires that
the action to be taken in "good faith" and because of "abnormally
dangerous conditions.

' 87

The meaning of these terms, and thereby

the right to avoid hazardous workareas, appears. to depend upon
whether a duty to arbitrate the safety issue can be found or implied in the labor contract.88
In NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp.,8" the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted a subjective standard to determine whether the
employees' acts were in good faith and whether the workplace was
abnormally dangerous. In this case, members of the buffing department walked off the job due to improper repair of an exhaust fan."
The court held that the testimony from the buffers as to the physical conditions of the plant was competent, "[laymen may testify
as to the physical conditions they have observed." ' Based upon
the employees' testimony, the court found the conditions inside
the buffing room were abnormally dangerous.'3 Although the
86. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) (emphasis added); see Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United
Bd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 510 F.2d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir. 1975).
87. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1974); 29
U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
88. Compare Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974)
(good faith belief of dangerous conditions does not overcome duty to arbitrate) with Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 529 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (3d Cir. 1975) (contract may exclude Gateway duty to arbitrate).
89. 252 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).

90. See id. at 756. The employees walked off due to their belief that the work conditions were unhealthy and in the face of the employer's contention that the conditions were
normal. See id. at 756.
91. See id. at 758.
92. See id. at 758. The employees testified at the NLRB hearing that they believed that
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Knight Morley court alluded to the good faith of the employees in
walking out,93 it appears that good faith was implied from the
presence of abnormally dangerous conditions. 4
The subjective test of "abnormally dangerous conditions"
adopted by the Knight Morley court was laid to rest with the
NLRB's Redwing Carriers decision. 5 In that case, the Board
stated:
We are of the opinion that the term [abnormally dangerous condition] contemplates, and is intended to insure, an objective, as opposed to a subjective, test. What controls is not the state of mind of
the employee or employees concerned, but whether the actual working conditions shown to exist by competent evidence might in the
circumstances reasonably be considered 'abnormally dangerous." 6
The objective standard of "abnormally dangerous conditions" has
been applied in all section 502 cases since Redwing Carrierswhere
the walk-off was otherwise prohibited by a no-strike provision of a
labor contract.9 7 This test was also expressly adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers. s
In the Gateway decision, the Supreme Court held that "a refusal
to work because of good faith apprehension of physical danger is
protected activity and not enjoinable, even where the employees
have subscribed to a comprehensive no-strike clause in their labor
continued work would be hazardous to their health due to the extreme heat and accumulation of dust. Id. at 756. Their testimony further established that the temperature of the
buffing room was 110 degrees, the humidity level high, and that the improperly repaired
exhaust fan failed to adequately remove dust. Id. at 756.
93. See id. at 756, 759.
94. See id. at 756-59. In Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court
expressly stated that the good faith belief of the employee can be found from "ascertainable,
objective evidence" of hazardous work conditions. See id. at 348.
95. See Redwing Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B 1208, 1209 (1961), aff'd sub nor. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
96. Id. at 1209; accord Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 414 U.S. 368, 387
(1974); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir.
1975).
97. See Stop & Shop, 161 NLRB 75, 76 n.3 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Machaby v. N.L.R.B,
377 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1967); see also NLRB v. Fruin-Colnan Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892
(8th Cir. 1964) (rejecting subjective test of Knight-Morley).
98. 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974); see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 519 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir. 1975).
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contract."99 The Court further stated that a work stoppage authorized by section 502 cannot be the basis for a damage award or Boys
Market injunction.100 The Court, however, found that an express
or implied duty to arbitrate extended to safety issues in the absence of explicit contractual exclusion. 10 ' It was, therefore, concluded that in the face of a duty to arbitrate, the employees' good
faith belief that an abnormally dangerous condition exists is not
enough. 02 In order to walk off a worksite under section 502 there
must be "ascertainable, objective evidence" supporting the "conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists." 03
The definition of "abnormally dangerous condition" has been
refined through the years. In Anaconda Aluminum, the NLRB
stated:
99. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974); see Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 529 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir. 1975); 29 U.S.C.
§ 143 (1976).
100. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974). In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Supreme Court stated that a nostrike obligation, whether express or implied, is the quid pro quo to the employers agreement to arbitrate labor disputes. Id. at 248; Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414
U.S. 368, 382 (1974); see Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (extending
Boys Market to implied undertakings not to strike). Thus, where there is a duty to arbitrate, whether expressed or implied, the courts may enjoin a pending strike and such injunction is referred to as a Boys Market injunction. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 380-82 (1974).
101. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). In the
Steelworkers trilogy, the United States Supreme Court pronounced a presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes. Id. at 377; see United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 364 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960) (known as the Steelworkers trilogy). In Gateway, the Court extended that
presumption to include the duty to arbitrate safety issues in the absence of express contractual exclusion. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 379, 382 (1974).
The Gateway Court, after finding a duty to arbitrate, then held that, unless otherwise
exempted, a safety "strike" could be enjoined under Boys Market. See id. at 380-87. The
Court reasoned that section 502 is a limited exception to a Boys Market injunction. See id.
at 385. It was held, however, that an honest belief, no matter how unjustified, is not sufficient to invoke the protection of section 502. Id. at 386. A union intending to "strike" unsafe
work conditions under section 502 must present "ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists." Id. at 387.
102. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974).
103. Id. at 387. The Gateway Court refused to permit the section 502 "strike" because
the district court's injunction corrected the safety hazard by suspending the two foremen
pending final arbitration. See id. at 387. The two foremen who were suspended constituted
the safety hazard which was the basis of this suit. See id. at 371-73.
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Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances which change
the character of the danger, work which is recognized and accepted
by employees as inherently dangerous does not become 'abnormally
dangerous' merely because employee patience with prevailing condi-

tions wears thin or their forbearance ceases.'"

Thus a section 502 walk-out requires an increase in the risk of danger over that considered to be normal for the particular job. 10 5 Unlike OSHA or NLRA, the mere existence of hazardous condition
may not be sufficient for an LMRA walk-out. 06 Rather, before the
employees "strike" the unsafe workareas they should obtain objective evidence showing that the conditions are hazardous beyond
the normal standard. 0 7 In the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers,10 8 the Gateway requirement of objective
evidence of "abnormally dangerous conditions" was established by
a violation of federal health and safety standards. The importance
of this decision is that it serves as a reminder that OSHA and
other health and safety violations may be used as objective evi104. 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 344 (1972); see also N.L.R.B v. Fruin-Colnan Constr. Co., 320
F.2d 885, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1964); Combustion Eng'g, 224 N.L.R.B. 76 (1976); Curtis Mathes
Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473, 474 (1963).
105. See Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473, 474 (1963).
106. See id. at 474. In Curtis Mathes the N.L.R.B. explained that the recurrent breakdown of the exhaust fan was the cause of the high dust content in the air impairing visibility
and breathing as well as producing sore throats. Id. at 474. The Board, however, pointed out
that the conditions were not so abnormally dangerous that the employees could walk-out,
and that the "highly unpleasant" conditions occurred periodically when the fans shut down.
Id. at 474. Thus, the conditions did not support a section 502 walk-out.
It is to be noted, however, that the 'recurrent breakdown of the fans and the continual
acceptance of the work conditions would not be a defense to a walk-out under section 7 of
NLRA or rule 1977.2(b)(2) of OSHA. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1980) (OSHA) (rule 1977.12(b)(2) permits work stoppage upon reasonable belief that work
conditions present imminent risk of death or serious injury); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (NLRA) (section 7 protects the right of workers to act together to improve their working conditions); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981)
(OSHA); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (section 7 of NLRA).
107. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 386-87 (1974) (ascertainable, objective evidence required); Anaconda Aluminum, 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 344 (1972)
(character of danger must exceed the acceptable norm).
108. 519 F.2d 1155, (3d Cir. 1975). In this case, a district court injunction of the work
stoppage was dissolved by the Third Circuit because the parties had contracted to allow a
mine safety committee to determine if the area was unsafe. The appellate court noted that
the action was not a "strike," but merely the removal of employees from the hazardous area
of the mine. Id. at 1156 Gateway was distinguished because there was objective evidence of
the dangerous condition, rather than the mere subjective reactions of the affected employees. See id. at 1156.
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dence of the degree of danger. 09 Objective evidence has also been
found where third parties have testified that the conditions were
unsafe.1"0 Likewise, in Baynard v. NLRB, 11 the court of appeals
explained that Gateway does not require that the objective evidence establish that the work condition was unsafe in fact, but
merely that the employee's belief that the worksite was unsafe be
supported by "ascertainable, objective evidence.""
Additionally, section 502 of LMRA provides that the affected individual has the right to walk off the worksite; 8 it does not, however, expressly allow a boycott by the union. 4 The union can,
under section 502, communicate to its workers that the workplace
is unsafe, and thereby boycott the employer, when its purpose is to
bring about the correction of such conditions.115 Furthermore, in
light of the Washington Aluminum decision 1 and section 7 of
109. Additionally, Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that records of
public agencies are admissible despite the unavailability of the declarant. Fed. R. Evid.
803(8).
110. See Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 344-45, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Ferguson's
Case) (opinion of a second driver and independent mechanic); NLRB v. Knight Morley
Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958) (testimony of
industrial health expert). In Ferguson v. NLRB, the companion case to Banyard, the employee refused to drive a truck which he asserted was unsafe. See Banyard v. N.L.R.B., 505
F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The employee "hailed" the opinion of a second driver who
confirmed the danger of the vehicle. The employee then took the truck to a mechanic who
informed him that the truck was unsafe and should not be driven. Subsequently, the employer sent out a safety supervisor and mechanic who indicated that the vehicle was safe. A
Department of Transportation safety inspector also stated that he could find nothing wrong
with the vehicle. Id. at 345. In affirming the employee's section 502 right to refuse to drive
the truck, the court stated that Gateway did not require that the work condition be unsafe
in fact, but merely that the employee's belief that the truck was unsafe be supported by
"ascertainable, objective evidence." Id. at 348. The testimony of the second driver and the
independent mechanic was sufficient objective evidence to justify the section 502 walk-off.
See id. at 348.
111. 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (post-Gateway decision).
112. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974).
113. Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 510 F.2d 1075,
1079 (6th Cir. 1975); see 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
114. Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 510 F.2d 1075,
1079 (6th Cir. 1975); see Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387
(1974) (section 502 did not deprive court of authority to enjoin strike).
115. Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 510 F.2d 1075,
1084 (6th Cir. 1975) (McCree, J., concurring); see Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519
F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (3d Cir. 1975).
116. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss5/2

18

Scarzafava: Workplace Safety - The Prophylactic and Compensatory Rights of th

19821

WORKPLACE SAFETY

NLRA," 7 employees, whether unionized or not, would have the
right to use concerted activities to promote the correction of the
unsafe work conditions.
In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.," 8 the United States
Supreme Court held that the employer violated section 8(a) (1) of
the NLRA" 9 by discharging seven employees who walked off the
worksite due to extremely cold work temperatures. The significance of this decision is that the Court held that a walk-out due to
health and safety conditions is a protected right under section 7 of
the NLRA.'2 ° Additionally, the Supreme Court stated that section
7 does not require a specific demand to remedy the hazardous condition before the employees engage in their concerted activity; section 7 protects "concerted activity whether they take place before,
after, or at the same time such a demand is made."'' Thus, the
117. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states in
pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."
118. 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). this section provides "it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See N.L.R.B. v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962). Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides that employees have the right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962); 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976).
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9, 17 (1962). In Washington Aluminum, seven employees walked off the worksite in protest
of extremely cold work temperatures believing their action could persuade the employer to
provide some heat. Id. at 12. The company's president decided to terminate the employees
who walked out as an example of employee discipline. The N.L.R.B. found that the action
of the workers was concerted activity to protest the company's failure to supply adequte
heat, and that such activity was protected under section 7 of NLRA. Id. at 12. The N.L.R.B.
ruled that the discharge of the employees was an 8(a) (1) violation and under section 10(c),
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), ordered that the employees be reinstated with backpay. NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962). The United States Supreme Court found
that the Board properly interpreted and applied the Act to the circumstances of the case.
See id. at 18.
121. Id. at 14 (1962). The employer contended that the employees lost their section 7
right because they walked off without affording the company an opportunity to avoid the
work stoppage by correcting the work condition. See id. at 13. The Supreme Court, however,
concluded that such a requirement would place an onerous restriction upon this right, and
thereby concluded that section 7 does not require a specific demand prior to engaging in
concerted activities. See id. at 14. In a post-Washington Aluminum decision the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Court ruled that the fact that the employer was presently undertaking
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employees were entitled to reinstatement with back pay.1 22
Section 7 protects work stoppages directed toward the correction
or improvement of work conditions. 23 Unlike section 502 of
LMRA, section 7 of NLRA requires concerted activity;'2 4 the acts
of an individual employee which are not shown to be for the mutual aid and protection of others are not protected under section
7.125 The actions of employees not exposed to the conditions are,
however, protected by section 7 when their purpose is for the aid
and protection of other workers. 2 6 Section 7 does not require new
and abnormally dangerous conditions; 27 under this section the employees may engage in concerted activities to ameliorate present

action toward the correction of the conditions did not remove the section 7 right to "strike."
See N.L.R.B. v. Elias Bros. Restaurants, 496 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
122. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 18 (1962); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1975). The discharge of the employees was an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(a)(1) of NLRA. See N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13, 18 (1962); 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) protects the employee's section 7 rights, including
the right to "strike" for the improvement of work conditions. See N.L.R.B. v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13, 18 (1962); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). The penalty for section 8(a) (1) violation includes reinstatement with backpay. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); see
N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.. 9, 13 (1962).
123. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13, 18 (1962);
N.L.R.B. v. Long Beach Youth Centers, Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Elias Bros. Restaurants, 496 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
124. Compare Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 510
F.2d 1075, 1079 (6th Cir. 1975) (LMRA) (right of the individual) with NLRB v. C & I Air
Conditioning, Inc., 468 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973) (NLRA) (section 7 does not protect
individual activity performed for individual benefit).
125. See NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973). In C
& I Air Conditioning, the court found that the employee's complaints about unsafe work
conditions were for his benefit only, and were not for the mutual aid or protection of other
workers. See id. at 978. That court, as well as many others, found that the actions of one
individual are protected under section 7 of NLRA if the evidence indicates that the employee's action was for the benefit of his co-workers. See id. at 978; NLRB v. Ben Perkin
Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Interboro Constr., Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500
(2d Cir. 1967).
126. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1966).
127. Compare Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 NLRB 473, 474 (1963) (LMRA) (periodic
unpleasant conditions insufficient for section 502) and Anaconda Aluminum, 197 NLRB
336, 344 (1972) (NLRA) (section 502 requires new factors which change risk of danger) with
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 11, 12-13, 18 (1962) (NLRA) (protest of
work conditions protected under § 7 where condition occurred from time to time). In fact,
under section 7 it does not matter that the employer is presently undertaking efforts to
improve or correct the work conditions. See NLRB v. Elias Bros. Restaurants, 496 F.2d
1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
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and future conditions, 2 8 as well as those which are recurrent. 2 9
The concerted activites of the employees in protest of working
conditions may take many forms, including a strike.1 30 The activities taken by the employees are protected by section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA. 31 Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an "unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em"
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. 1132
Sanctions for the employer's unfair labor practice include those
measures necessary to make the employee whole, including reinstatement with back pay."8'
2.

Occupational Safety And Health Act

Pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor in 1973 promulgated rule 1977.12.1" In this rule, the
Secretary explained that OSHA implies certain rights to the employee,"3 5 but that the Act does not "entitle employees to walk off
the job because of potential unsafe work conditions at the workplace." 38 Rule 1977.12(b)(2) provides:
128. See Bob's Casing Crews, Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (5th Cir. 1972).
129. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 11, 12-13, 18 (1962).
130. See, e.g., NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Center, Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir.
1979) (work stoppage); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Restaurant, 496 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (protests over working conditions and efforts to persuade other employees to
walk out); United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (collective bargaining), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); First
Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1969) (strike).
131. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962).
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
133. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962); 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1981). The Secretary of Labor has rule making power under
29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 657(g)(2) (1976).
135. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4-5 n.3 (1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(a)
(1981).
136. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4-5 n.3 (1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)
(1) (1981). The employee does not, under OSHA, have the right to walk off the job, because
the right to an inspection will normally correct the hazard. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1)
(1981). It is to be noted, however, that rule 1977.12(b)(1) does not supersede section 502 of
LMRA or section 7 of NLRA; therefore, although the employee may not be entitled to walk
off under OSHA, he may be under LMRA or NLRA. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445
U.S. 1, 17-18 n. 29 (1980). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) (LMRA) (right to avoid abnormally dangerous condition) and id. § 157 (NLRA) (right to use concerted activity to improve work conditions) with 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1981) (OSHA does not entitle employee to walk off job).
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[O]ccasions may arise when an employee is confronted with a choice
between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses, in
good faith, to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would
37
be protected against subsequent discrimination.

In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,'8 8 the United States Supreme
Court held that rule 1977.12(b)(2) was properly "promulgated by
the Secretary in the valid exercise of authority under the Act."' 3 9
In upholding the rule, the Supreme Court stated:
[C]ircumstances may sometimes exist in which the employee justifiably believes that the express statutory arrangement [of OSHA]
does not sufficiently protect him from death or serious injury. Such
circumstances will probably not often occur, but such a situtation
may arise when (1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work
under conditions that the employee reasonably believes pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee
has reason to believe that there is not sufficient time or opportunity
either to seek effective redress from his employer or to apprise
OSHA of the danger. 4

The OSHA right to avoid unsafe work areas is more limited than
its LMRA and NLRA counterparts.14 1 First of all, the OSHA right
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981); see Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4-5
n.3 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Rule
1977.12(b)(2) continues:
The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must be of
such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the
employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury and
that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the
danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such
circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and have been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
138. 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
139. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980); accord Usery v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
140. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980); see 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
141. See Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981) (OSHA) (employee can walk off job when conditions
pose imminent risk of death or serious injury and regulatory system not swift enough to
protect employee) with 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) (LMRA) (right to avoid abnormally dangerous condition) and id. § 157 (NLRA) (right to strike for improved work conditions).
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exists only so long as the OSHA regulatory system is not able to
properly protect the employee."" Once the OSHA inspector has arrived and determined that the risk of danger is not imminent, the
employee cannot refuse to work under rule 1977.12(b)(2). 1 ' s Additionally, in order to walk out under the OSHA rule the employee
must reasonably believe that the work conditions pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury."' LMRA and NLRA
merely require that the work conditions be "abnormally dangerous"'45 and unsatisfactory," ' respectively; unlike OSHA they do
not require that the perceived danger be "imminent." An OSHA
walk out also requires the employee, where possible, to seek the
correction of the dangerous condition from his employer before he
14 7
leaves the job.
To understand rule 1977.12(b)(2), one must realize its purpose
within the OSHA system. The OSHA right to walk off the workplace is not designed to promote workplace safety; OSHA achieves
this goal through its regulatory and inspection process.' Rule
1977.12(b)(2), rather, is intended to assure the employee of his
right to avoid unsafe work areas on those occasions when the
OSHA regulatory system is ineffective in preserving the employee's
health and safety. '

142. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4-5 n.3 (1980); Usery v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976). NLRA and LMRA right exist so long as
the condition exists. See Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bd.of Carpenters & Joiners,
510 F.2d 1075, 1184 (McCree, J., concurring) (can boycott until condition corrected).
143. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981). It is to
be noted, however, that if the conditions are "abnormally dangerous" the employees may
continue their work stoppage under section 502 of LMRA, (see notes 90-122 and accompanying text, supra); or the employees may continue their work stoppage under section 7 of
NLRA when their purpose is to improve or correct the work conditions for their mutual aid
or protection, (see notes 123-140 and accompanying text, supra).
144. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4-5 n.3 (1980); Usery v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
145. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
146. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13, 18 (1962).
147. See Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
148. See Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
149. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 424 F.Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
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The Right to "Strike For Pay"

A major question posed by the Whirlpool decision is whether the
employee is entitled to be compensated while avoiding the unsafe
work area.' 0 The Supreme Court clearly explained that rule
1977.12(b)(2) does not expressly require employers to pay workers
who refuse to perform imminently dangerous tasks. 5 ' The Court,
however, recognized that the employee may not be discriminated
against, 1 52 and left the issue of whether discrimination occurred
when the employees were denied their pay to the lower courts. 53
Similarly, section 502 of LMRA does not expressly require the employer to pay the employee who avoids abnormally dangerous conditions.15 4 Despite the absence of an express statement in these
statutes, it appears that the employee would be entitled to compensation in most instances. 55
Initially, a claim for wages is based upon the contract of employment. 5 1 Under general contract law, the performance of the requested service by the employee is a condition precedent to the
employer's obligation to pay wages. 157 The employer, however, has
the concurrent obligation to provide the employee with reasonably
safe employment. 158 This obligation is a condition precedent to the
employee's duty to perform the requested labor. 5"9 Therefore, since
150. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1980). Of course, if the em-

ployee merely refuses to perform an assigned task, but does perform other services for the
employer-such functions being out of the zone of danger-then the employee should be
entitled to compensation for hours worked in accordance with the terms of the employment
contract. See Burry v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 338 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1964) (employer obligated to pay for all hours that he knowingly suffers or permits an employee to
perform). For a further discussion on the right to be paid, see United Steelworkers of
America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1233 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and Marshall v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 618 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980).
151. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 19 (1980).
152. See id. at 19; 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1981).
153. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 19 n.31 (1980).
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
155. See Marshall v. N.L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir.).
156. See Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F.Supp. 127, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1969), afl'd,
423 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1970) (duty to pay wages arises from employee-employer relationship); Pioneer Casualty Co. v. Bush, 457 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (employer-employee relationship is embodied in contract).
157.
158.
Co., 100
159.

See L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 322-23 (2d ed. 1965).
Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975); see Hough v. Railway
U.S. 213, 217 (1879).
Rule 1977.12(b) (2) of OSHA and section 502 of LMRA provide that the employee
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the employer's own acts-the failure to provide reasonably safe
employment-prevents the employees from working, the employees are entitled to their expected compensation while awaiting the
correction of the work conditions. 160
Secondly, with respect to an OSHA authorized work stoppage,
both section 11(c) and rule 1977.12(b)(2) provide that the employee may not be discriminated against. 161 A complaint of discrimination must be filed with the Secretary of Labor within thirty
days from when the employee was discharged or otherwise discriminated against. 1e2 Complaints filed after the thirty days are generally considered stale; where strong extenuating circumstances exist,
however, the thirty day period may be tolled in order to allow the
Secretary to process the complaint.' Once the complaint is filed,
the Secretary must notify the employee whether his section 11(c)
rights have been violated.'"" If the Secretary believes that grounds
for a violation exist, he may seek an award of back pay as an equi-

has the right to avoid unsafe work areas. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11
(1980); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974); see also NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13, 18 (1962) (NLRA) (avoiding unsafe and unhealthy workareas is a protected right of the employee under section 7). At common law, the
employer has the duty to provide reasonably safe workareas. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100
U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975). Since
Whirlpool, Gateway, and Washington Aluminum hold that the employee does not have to
work in an unsafe work environment, the presence of safe and healthy work conditions is a
condition precedent to the obligation of the employees to perform their work services. See
L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 300-01, 321-22 (2d ed. 1965). Where the
terms of a contract for an agreed exchange are to be rendered at different times, the performance which is to come first in time is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of
the other party to perform later. Id. at 300-01, 321-22.
160. The employee is entitled to damages produced by the employer's breach of the
duty to provide safe employment; such damages are the amount expected to be earned from
the contract, which should be the employee's expected wages. See Young v. Watson, 140
S.W. 840, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1911, writ ref'd); see also United States ex rel.
R.F. Lee Elec. Co. v. Stack, 308 F.Supp. 45, 51 (E.D. Va. 1968), a/i'd, 420 F.2d 698 (4th Cir.
1970) (per curiam) (party prevented from performing a contract is entitled to recover damages for breach); Davis Bumper to Bumper v. American Petrofina Co., 420 S.W.2d 145, 151
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer cannot breach contract, thereby
rendering performance impossible, and then escape liability).
161. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976);
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1976).
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
163. See Usery v. Northern Tank Line, Inc., No. CV-76-41-BLG (D. Mont. 1976)
(waited 90 days before filing complaint because work position was seasonal); 29 C.F.R. §
1977.15(d)(3) (1981).
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(3) (1981).
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table remedy to the violation. 165 In this respect, it appears that if
the employer is willing to pay the employee while working under
the hazardous conditions, it would be discriminatory not. to pay
those employees who are ready, willing, and able to do work but
1 66
for the unsafe working conditions.
Additionally, the discharge or discrimination of an employee exercising his right to avoid unsafe workareas is an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) of NLRA. 167 It is well settled
that employees "striking" unfair labor practices are entitled to
back pay."' It is further established that where a causal responsibility for the employee's loss can be linked to the employer, the
69
employer will be assessed the obligation to pay the back pay.
Therefore, when the employer has endangered his employees'
safety and health by providing unsafe areas for the performance of
assigned tasks, the employees are entitled to pay while exercising
the right to protect their lives.
Although at first glance requiring the payment of wages to nonworking employees may seem harsh, the rule is necessary for the
protection of employee health and safety. Without such a provision, the employer could coerce the employee to work in unsafe
conditions due to economic necessity, 17 0 thus placing each employee in the position of potential death or injury. It must be
remembered that the employee does not give up his right to safety
and health by accepting a position of employment. The employer,

165. See Marshall v. N.L. Indus. 618 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980); Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, 441 F.Supp. 385, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976). For other labor actions dealing with discrimination, see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1967) (company's failure to pay
benefits to strikers is discrimination in simplest form); Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476
F.2d 868, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (practice applied uniformly to all employees may be discriminatory); NLRB v. American Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 339 F.2d 324, 327 (2d
Cir. 1964) (discrimination occurred when distinction arbitrarily made without sound basis
which worked to employee's detriment).
167. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962); 29 U.S.C. §§
157, 158 (1976). The ability to walk off unsafe work areas is a right protected by section 7 of
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13
(1962).
168. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51 (1972); 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1976); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962) (employees reinstated with backpay).
169. See NLRB v. United Marine Div., 417 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1008 (1970).
170. This would be an unfair labor practice in itself. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
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rather, assumes the duty of protecting his employees from unrea-

sonable risks of injury by providing a reasonably safe work place.171
The employee should not be compelled to wait until he is injured
before he is able to hold the employer to his duty to provide reasonably safe employment. The employer should not be able to ben-

efit from his wrong at the potential cost of the employee.17 ' Thus,

if the prophylactic rights are to serve their function, they must

give the employee a viable choice to avoid the hazardous work
conditons.
III.

COMPENSATION RIGHTS

A. The Common Law And Statutory Right To Compensation
For Workplace Injuries
Despite the presence of prophylactic measures, working conditions continue to be unsafe and employees are often injured. 7 3 As
previously discussed, when the employee's injury can be traced to

the employer's negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work,
the employer is liable to the employee. 17 4 For years, however, the

courts have refused to recognize the rights of the employees and
have denied their recovery by means of the "unholy trinity" of
common law defenses-assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule.1 7 In an attempt to remove
171. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 568
(Tex. 1972).
172. See Davis Bumper to Bumper v. American Petrofina Co., 420 S.W.2d 145, 151
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. "[A]ny place where an accident occurs is not a safe place to work at that instant."
Gonzales v. Lubbock State School, 487 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no
writ). It is estimated that 7,000,000 Americans are injured each year in industrial accidents.
Keeton, Products Liability-DesignHazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L. Rv.
293, 293 n.1 (1979).
174. See, e.g., Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754-57 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v.
Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972); W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed. 1971.)
175. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF TORTS 526-27 (4th ed.
1971); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CoRNMeL L.Q. 206,
223-25 (1952). The "unholy trinity" of defenses were not developed and applied to workmen's injuries until the last half of the 19th century. Thus they are relatively new and not
firmly entrenched in the common law. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655,
658 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
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these defenses and to allow the employee compensation for his in-

jury, most state legislatures passed statutory measures 17 6 which
have evolved into the worker's compensation laws of today. 177 In

this section we shall explore the second phase of workplace safety;
the employee's right to compensation for his injuries. In particular,

we shall analyze the intent and purpose of worker's compensation

legislation and its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in modern society.
1. Worker's Compensation

Although the common law afforded the employee the right to a
safe place to work and the right to compensation for any injury
resulting from the employer's negligence, most workplace injuries
remained uncompensated.17 An understanding of the effectiveness
of the common law cause of action can be seen from a classification
of the causes or fault of workplace injuries revealed in a 1907 Ger-

man study. 17 The study revealed the total number of accidents
were caused in the following manner in the indicated percentages:

1) negligence or fault of the employer, 16.81%; 2) joint negligence
of the employer and the injured employee, 4.66%; 3) negligence of
a fellow servant, 5.28%; 4) acts of God, 2.31%; 5) fault or negligence of the injured employee, 28.89%; and 6) inevitable accidents
connected with employment, 42.05%.

180

Using these figures, ' 81 it is

OF TORTS 527-29 (4th ed. 1971).
176. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); Matthews v. University of Texas, 295 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1956, no writ); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th
ed. 1971); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 206 (1952).
177. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751, 754-57 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567,
569 (Tex. 1972); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526-27 (4th ed. 1971).
178. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 226 S.W. 154, 156
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1920), aff'd, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (Tex. 1922); W. PRossuR,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The Nature and Origins of
Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 224-25 (1952).
179. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNzuL
L.Q. 206, 224-25 (1952).
180. Id. at 224.
181. The authors do not believe that these figures accurately represent the breakdown
for fault for present day workplace injuries. With the rise of products liability law, many
accidents previously categorized as inevitable are compensable under strict tort liability or
warranty. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 402B (1965) (strict tort liability);
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apparent that the employee was remediless in over 83 % of all injuries.182 The common law defense of contributory negligence would
bar all causes represented by category number 2,183 the fellow servant rule would prevent recovery in category number 3,184 and recovery for categories 4, 5 and 6 would be denied due to the employee's inability to establish that the employer was negligent. 88
Thus, the employee would only be able to recover 16.8% of the
time,1 6 and those recoveries were often denied by overzealous
courts which found that the employee voluntarily assumed the risk
of injury by continuing to work in spite of the dangers created by
his employer. 187 Under the common law system, therefore, the burden of injury was placed upon the employee, who was least able to
afford it.' 88
The ineffectiveness of the common law system was established in
courts which were reluctant to grant recoveries to the uninfluential, employee against his prominent, businessman employer. This
position was epitomized in the pre-compensation law philosophy
that the industrial enterprise could best be encouraged by making
the burdens on industry as light as possible."' The courts effectu-

U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -314, -315 (warranty). The authors merely use these figures as a breakdown
of fault as recognized under the law as existing in the early 20th century.
182. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 225 (1952); see also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980) (recovery had in less than 25% of all work accidents); Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 226 S.W. 154, 156 (Tex.
Civ.App.-Galveston 1920), alI'd, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922) (employee remediless in
80% of all injuries). See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th
ed. 1971).
183. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Louis Southwestern. Ry. Co., 134 S.W. 1175, 1176-77
(Tex. 1911); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 527 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The
.Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 224 (1952).
184. See, e.g., Armour v. Hahn, 111 U.S. 313, 319 (1884); Hough v. Railway Co., 100
U.S. 213, 215-16 (1879); Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902, 910 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e); see also Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 223-24 (1952).
185. See, e.g., Armour v. Hahn, 111 U.S. 313, 318 (1884); J. Weingarten, Inc. v.
Sandefer, 490 S.W. 2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Larson,
The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 224-25 (1952).
186. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 206, 225 (1952).
187. Id. at 225; see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 527-28 (4th ed.
1971).
188. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th ed. 1971).
189. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
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ated this prejudice through the "unholy trinity" of common law
defenses.190
The common law system also required the injured employee to
go to court, which meant delay as well as heavy attorney's fees and
other costs."' Thus, when the employee was fortunate enough to
obtain a recovery, he actually took home a small part of the money
paid. 92 Additionally, the resulting delay and need for money to
meet everyday living expenses pressured the employee to settle his
claim for much less than it was worth. 93 As a result, there was
very little incentive for the employer to improve the working

conditions. 194
Commencing in 1910, most of the states enacted worker's compensation insurance. 95 The expressed theory behind this legislation was that "the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman."' 9 In actuality, the statutes were designed as an attempt to ensure that the injured employee received sufficient income and medical care to keep him from destitution. 9 ' Arthur
Larson, a renowned author in the field of worker's compensation,
explained the philosophy of compensation statutes in the following
manner:
Suppose claimant has worked for ten years at a drill press, at a
salary which is not calculated to enable him to accumulate private
annuities to care for him if he should have to stop working. The
rules require him to wear a safety harness, and, although it is a hot
and uncomfortable appliance, he has worn it faithfully until the day
of injury, when in a moment of carelessness, he operates the machine without the harness and crushes both hands.
A system of law based in any degree on individual merit at the
instant of the accident can see only one result: nonliability. The emL.Q. 206, 223 (1952).
190. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526-30 (4th ed. 1971); Larson,
The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation,37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 223-25 (1952).
191. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th ed. 1971).
192. Id. at 530.
193. Id. at 530.
194. See id. at 530.
195. See id. at 530; Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial
Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 532, 533 (1954).
196. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 530 (4th ed. 1971).
197. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARV. L. REv. 328, 333 (1912); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensa-

tion, 37

CORNELL

L.Q. 206, 209-10 (1952).
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ployee not only was negligent, but violated a safety rule. The employer, on the other hand, has thoughtfully provided a safety device
and had done all he could by enforcing the rule requiring its use. To
require the innocent employer to pay the "guilty" employee might
seem to flout the entire moral basis of law. In an entirely individualistic moral code, this might be so, but let us see what happens when
considerations of social morality are introduced.
The society surrounding the disabled man can do one of three
things:
First, it can refuse all aid, and let him starve in the street, or let
him squat on the sidewalk with a few pencils and beg for pennies
from those who were yesterday his equals.
Second, it can put him on county relief, or some other form of
direct handout. This, while better than the first, is a poor solution in
at least two ways: it stigmatizes the man as a pauper, and it places
the cost on the political and geographical area where he happens to
have his residence, although that subdivision had no connection
with the injury.
Third, it can grant him Worker's Compensation, thus preserving
his dignity and self-respect as an injured veteran of industry, which
is psychologically and morally the best of the three solutions, and
placing the cost where it rightly belongs, on the consumers of the
product whose production was the occasion of the injury.'" s
The workers' compensation statutes, therefore, are systems providing assistance to the injured employee at the cost of the consuming public.19 9
Workers' compensation does not rest upon the notion of fault,
but is a compromise between tort law and social insurance.2 0 0 Generally speaking, workers' compensation covers employees: who are
employed in non-exempt or designated employments against harm
which can be classified as either personal injury by accident, sustained in connection with such employment, or occupational disease (as defined by the controlling statute) contracted in such em-

198. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 209-10 (1952).
199. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Larson,
The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 210 (1952).
200. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 525 (4th ed. 1971). See generally,
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 207-21
(1952) (comparing tort and social justice principles to workmen's compensation).
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ployment, resulting in disability or death." 1 The primary issue in a
workers' compensation action is whether the injury arose from and
in the course of employment. 202 Thus, under workers' compensation legislation, the employee is entitled to compensation when he
can show a compensable injury resulting from his employment."0
The workers' compensation statutes shift the cost of injury from
the employee to the employer (and ultimately to the consumer of
the particular product) by means of insurance,0 4 since the covered
employer is generally required, either directly or indirectly, to obtain compensation insurance. 0 5 The cost of the insurance is then
passed on to the consumer just as if it were raw materials or some
other component of the product 2 0 6 Money collected from various
subscribers of the insurance is pooled by the carrier to compensate
covered, injured employees. 7 The more hazards the particular
employment and particular employer experience, the higher the
rate the employer pays for the compensation insurance.2 08 Thus,
through sheer economics or through indirect pressure by the insurance carrier, the employer may be induced to correct defective and
dangerous work conditions.2 0 '
In the order for the employee to recover in a workers' compensation action, he must establish that he has received a compensable
injury during the course of his employment.2 10 The employee does

201. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 536 (1954).
202. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); see Bohlen, A
Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REV. 328, 329
(1912); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 208 (1952).
203. See W. PROSSER, HANDOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The
Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 208 (1952).
204. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971).
205. See id.; Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L.Rsv. 531, 534, 560 (1954).
206. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971).
207. Cf. Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF L. REV. 531, 558-59 (1954) (carrier assumes the risk that losses
may exceed income from policies).
208. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 206, 215, 218 (1952).
209. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 555 (1954) (workmen's compensation designed to
enhance industrial safety).
210. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The
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not have to establish that the employer was at fault,211 nor are the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of
the risk, or the fellow servant rule a bar to his recovery. 21 ' Additionally, the statutory framework has attempted to eliminate the
lengthy delays of common law litigation by establishing an administrative body to administer workers' compensation claims. 13
2. Attacking The Citadel-Workers' Compensation Today
Workers' compensation statutes are not totally a samaritan act
of the legislature. The acts are, in fact, compromised legislation
wherein the employer gave up the common law defenses in exchange for the limitation of recovery by the employee.' 14 Under
workers' compensation statutes the amount of compensation to
which the employee is entitled is statutorily fixed according to the
nature and degree of the injury.218 Generally, the injured employee
is entitled to recover his medical expenses and a percentage of his
lost income, but is allowed no recovery for pain and suffering, or
disfigurement.2' Additionally, when an employee is found to be
covered by the workers' compensation act he is entitled to his limited statutory recovery; any potential common law recovery is
barred." 7
Although workers' compensation statutes have served a great legal and social function,"' s the system lacks the element of justice
Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 208 (1952); Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensationfor IndustrialAccidents Here and Abroad, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 531, 541-55 (1954).
211. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The
Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 208 (1952).
212. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); see New York
Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-201 (1917)
213. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Worker's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206,
206 (1952).
214. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); see New York
central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
215. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Riesenfeld,
Contemporary Trends in Compensation for IndustrialAccidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 553-55 (1954).
216. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 206, 213-14 (1952); Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial
Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CAL.IF. L. REv. 531, 555-57 (1954).
217. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The
Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 206 (1952).
218. See generally, Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37
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for the employee injured at the hands of his employer. As cogently
explained by Arthur Larson, workers' compensation statutes are
designed to, and do to a certain degree, serve a social function by
providing the injured employee with sufficient income and medical
care to keep him from destitution." ' The statues, however, are not
designed to compensate the employee for his injury, but merely to
provide him with the bare minimum of income and medical care to
keep him from being a burden to others.2 20 The argument against
compensation payments which equal the actual loss is that such an
arrangement would "encourage malingering and trumped-up
claims. ' 22 1 In this respect, however, it must be remembered that
worker's compensation is not a division of tort law, but is a compromise between tort principles and social insurance.2 2
When one takes the "guilty" employee-innocent employer example used by Arthur Larson to explain the philosophy of worker's
compensation, it is easy to understand the act's principles and
form of social justice.2 8 The utility of this analysis and the
worker's compensation system is lost, however, in those 16.81% of
the cases where the injury is the result of the employer's negligence.2 24 The common law has always been characterized by its
adaptability; its ability to provide new remedies to meet the changing conditions of our time.22 5 In part, workers' compensation legislation has done this by providing a remedy to the injured employee
where the prior common law system had failed.2 2 In the process,
however, the legislation has thrown the baby out with the

L.Q. 206, 209-10 (1952) (social justice performed by assuring each injured employee enough income and medical care to keep him from destitution); Bohlen, A Problem
in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REv. 328, 333 (1912) (statCORNELL

utes protect workmen and their dependents from social and economic degradation).
219. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 209-10, 213 (1952); accord Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 333 (1912).
220. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 213 (1952).
221. Id. at 214.
222. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 525 (4th ed. 1971). See generally
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952).
223. See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 206, 209-10 (1952).
224. See id. at 224.
225. See id. at 223.
226. See id. at 223.
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bathwater"" by limiting the recovery of those employees who had a
remedy at common law.2' Under the present system, those employees who are capable of establishing a common law claim
against their employer, and thereby entitled to compensation for
their full loss, are limited to the scant workers' compensation recovery.2 29 This result is not only unjust, but also unnecessary to
the effectuation of the workers' compensation system.
The compensation statutes were not designed to remove or replace the common law remedies.23 0 The common law remedy was
based upon fault; it required the employee to establish that his
employer was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of his injury.23' Although workers' compensation did not require fault, it was reasoned that "where the employer has personally been guilty of a deliberate failure to provide adequately for the
safety of his work-people, he should be liable to make an enhanced
compensation, or the employee's right to sue for all his loss at common law should be preserved.'' 2 The rule that the employer
should be fully accountable283 for his negligence is based upon the
reasonable belief that it would reduce the commission of such
faults and thus reduce the number of workplace injuries. 3 ' Addi-

227. The states have precluded the common law cause of action with the enactment of
workmen's compensation acts. New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201
(1917) (statute sets aside one body of rules and establishes another in its place); see, e.g.,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1982); TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 3 (Vernon 1967).
228. The recovery under worker's compensation is much less than presently can be recovered at common law. For example, in Petro-Weld, Inc. v. Luke, 619 F.2d 418, 419 (5th
Cir. 1980), the injured employee received a mere $19,225.18 in compensation for an injury
valued at $400,000.00 by a jury under common law principles. See also Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. 1975) (workmen's compensation in the amount of $35,326.42 received
for injury valued by jury at $303,126.42).
229. See note 233 supra. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531
(4th ed. 1971) (statutory compensation is sole remedy).
230. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARv. L. REV. 328, 333 (1912); see also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 660
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980).
231. See Farley v M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754-57 (Tex. 1975); Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 526-27 (4th ed. 1971).
232. Bohlen, A Problem in the Draftingof Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 328, 333 (1912).
233. The authors use this term to connote that the employer is liable for the full
amount of common law damages, as opposed to the scant worker's compensation award.
234. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Act, 25 HAR. L.
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tionally, the enhanced compensation generally will not shut down a
business, while to deprive a worker and his family just compensation will be to their economic destruction."'
The major argument against enhanced compensation or preservation of common law remedies is that it "would encourage malingering and trumped-up claims."" 6 This argument, however, is exaggerated. No one suggests that the no fault provisions of worker's
compensation be applied to the enhanced compensation or common law claim. Rather, these actions would require the employee
to establish his employer's negligence and that the employer's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury."s 7 The establishment
of such claims, as shown by the lack of successful actions at common law, would weed out the invalid claims. This is not to say that
workers' compensation should be abolished-such acts do perform
a vital social function"sa-but where the injured employee has a
valid common law claim, the act designed to ensure the worker's
dignity and economic needs"39 should not deprive him of the full
recovery to which he is entitled. 4 0 The result is that workers' compensation has deprived many people of their life, liberty and property by removing their common law remedy. 1 It is at the crust of
REV. 328, 333 (1912).
235. Id. at 334.
236. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 214 (1952).
237. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARV. L. REV. 328, 333 (1912) (enhanced compensation or common law rights preserved in
cases where employer at fault); see also, Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754-57
(Tex. 1975) (common law requires proof of negligence and proximate cause); Leadon v.
Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972) (employee must prove that
employer was negligent and that such negligence was proximate cause of injury); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS at 526-27 (4th ed. 1971).
238. The worker's compensation acts perform a vital social function by providing relief
to injured employees who otherwise may become a burden to society and government by
joining welfare rolls. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917);
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation,37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 209-10
(1952).
239. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARV. L. REV. 328, 333 (1912); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 210, 213 (1952).
240. In response, it may be argued that worker's compensation requires the employer to
pay the injured employee even when the employer is not at fault, but this is incorrect since
it is the consumer and not the employer who pays the cost of worker's compensation. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS at 530-31 (4th ed. 1971).
241. Cf. New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (doubtful
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our society that he who is at fault should bear the loss, but here
the innocent employee is required to bear the loss, for the acts of
his negligent employer.24
In New York Central Railroad Company v. White,"s The
United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether the
State could, without violating the due process clause, set aside the
common law rights and establish the workers' compensation sys-

tem.2 44 The Court doubted whether the State could abolish all

rights without establishing an adequate substitute.2 45 The Court
found the workers' compensation statutes to be an adequate substitute for the common law remedies." ' On the point of compensation, the Supreme Court stated:
If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in
case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of damages.2 "
Thus, the Court found that the reduced expense and delay of the
administrative process equaled the additional damages obtainable
through the common law cause of action. 4 8 In 1917 the trade-off of
limited damages for the absence of the common law defenses was
favorable to the employee.2" Given the transition of the law over
whether state could abolish common law rights without establishing an adequate
substitute).
242. The worker's compensation acts limit the employee to the statutory recovery.
Thus in a case where the employer is the sole party at fault, or jointly with the injured
employee, the injured party would be limited to the scant worker's compensation where a
common law recovery may be ten to twenty times greater. Cf. Petro-Weld, Inc. v. Luke, 619
F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1980) ($19,225.18 in compensation for injury valued at $400,000.00 at
common law); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. 1975) ($35,326.42 worker's compensation compared to $303,126.42 at common law).
243. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
244. See id. at 201.
245. See id. at 201.
246. See id. at 201.
247. Id. at 201.
248. See id. at 201. In fact, in Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917), the United
States Supreme Court accepted the view of the lawmaker that the workmen's compensation
act was more beneficial to the employee than the common law rules of employer liability.
Accord New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
249. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917).
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the past sixty-three years, however, the exchange is no longer
equitable.
In 1917 the workers' compensation statutes were an adequate

substitute for the common law cause of action because its remedy
was certain, speedy, and less expensive.2 0° At that time it was estimated that the average working man could exist no longer than

two weeks without some income; thus, it was perceived that
worker's compensation would put money into the injured employee's hands within that time period.2 51 Although the average
employee may not be able to hold out any longer today, we know
that the administrative process is not so swift or certain.2 5 The

employee's right to compensation and the amount thereof are contested through the entire administrative process, and often into
the courts. Even when a compromised settlement can be obtained,
it often occurs months after the employee was injured and put out
of work. Workers' compensation is not the swift, certain harmoni-

ous relationship between the employer and employee as imagined;
it has become a battle of experts where the degree of injury and

amount of compensation are contested. Additionally, the common
law defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence,
and the fellow servant rule have been greatly diminished or abolished.2 5 8 Thus, the trade-ofP evidenced by workers' compensation

250. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
251. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L.
REv. 328, 331 (1912); see New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917)
(swift and certain remedy).
252. The two week waiting period for the initiation of worker's compensation payments
envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in New York Central R.R. has become a
thing of the past. In fact, the Texas Industrial Accident Board may allow the insurance
carrier an average of 30 days from date of incapacity to the date compensation is instituted.

See Rule 061.12.00.020,

RULES OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD

(1977). The Texas quarterly

performance ratings often reveal several insurance carriers that average in excess of three
weeks before instituting compensation payments. In individual cases, compensation may be
withheld months without sanction to the insurance carrier. A request for an adminstrative
hearing to compel the institution of compensation payments may yield a hearing several
weeks to months later depending upon the congestion of the hearing examiner's calendar.
253. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 533-34 (4th ed. 1971); see Reboni
v. Case Bros., 78 A.2d 887, 889 (Conn. 1951) (fellow servant rule practically disappeared
with adoption of workmen's compensation); Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 194 So.
353, 360 (Fla. 1940) (employee does not assume risks caused by master's negligence nor the
negligence of those for whom the master is responsible); Ritter v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080,
1086-87 (Ore. 1961) (en banc) (employee does not assume risk arising out of employer's
negligence); Farley v MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) (volenti-assumption
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is no longer equitable today, and, consequently, the deprivation of
the injured employee's common law cause of action may violate the
due process clause. 55 This is not to throw the workers' compensation system out with the bathwater, but the remedy must be an
adequate substitute for the common law remedy,'" i.e., the employee should be entitled to enhanced compensation or common
law damages when he is able to establish the common law liability
of his employer. 57
B.

Is The Employer-The Third Party Cause Of Action

Although workers' compensation has abated many of the employee's common law rights, the courts agree that every presumption should be on the side of preserving these rights in the absence
of compelling statutory language or social policy justification.258 In
this respect, it is important to note that workers' compensation
laws attempt to regulate the employee's rights with respect to his

of the risk defenses are abolished in negligence actions); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373
P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962) (en banc) (limitation upon contributory negligence and assumption of the risk defenses); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982) (comparative negligence replacing contributory negligence).
The fellow servant rule is a peculiar defense associated with employer-employee actions.
It is based upon the fiction that "the fellow workman's negligence is one of the natural and
ordinary risks of the occupation assumed by the employee." New York Central R.R. Co. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1917); see F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTs 292 (1933). It is a form of
the volenti or assumption of the risk defense. F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 292 (1933). Thus,
with the abolition of the volenti defenses in negligence cases in Texas and other states, it
appears that the fellow servant rule is additionally reduced to the question of the employee's comparative negligence. See Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex.
1975) (assumption of the risk abolished as defense in negligence cases). In fact, no reported
Texas case has applied the fellow servant rule since the Farley decision. The last reported
Texas decision to apply the fellow servant rule instructed the trial court to consider the
effect of the Farley decision. See Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902, 912 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo, 1975, writ refd n.r.e) (on motion for rehearing).
254. Limited damages were traded for the surrender of common law defenses. See New
York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971).
255. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (due process
may be violated unless common law remedy is replaced by adequate substitute).
256. See id. at 201.
257. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L.
REV. 328, 333 (1912).

258. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); 2 A. Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1 72.50
(1976).
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employer; they do not affect the employee's rights against one

other than his employer.25 This is an important concept because

not all injuries are the exclusive fault of the employer; very often a
third party-someone other than the injured employee or his employer-may be at fault. If this other party is not the employer,

then the employee can maintain a true common law action against60
this party without any artificial limitation upon his damages.2
Thus, in evaluating the employee's right to compensation for workplace injuries, it is necessary to consider if someone other than the
employer is at fault. Since only the employer can hide behind the
limited damages shield of workers' compensation,' 6 a vital issue is
the determination of who is "the employer" under the workers'
compensation statutes.
Although most workers' compensation statutes have a provision
defining the term "employer," the relationship is generally determined under common law agency rules.2 2 Until recently, one of
259. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655,657 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980). Kentucy's Act grants immunity from common law negligence to
"employer"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284,
291 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Georgia worker's compensation permits employee to sue third party
tortfeasor despite compensation award against employer); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244
F.Supp. 151, 153 (D.D.C. 1965) (one "other than the employer" not immune under Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act); Wagstaff v. City of Groves, 419 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (Texas' act maintained employee's right to
bring common law action against third party tortfeasor).
260. See Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 212, 219-20 (8th Cir. 1970)
(Nebraska law does not permit third party tortfeasor a set-off for plaintiff's workmen's compensation); Bedwell v. Riddle, 345 F.2d 183, 183 (5th Cir 1965) (per curiam) (injured plaintiff entitled to entire damages arising from injury from third party under Mississippi law);
Gundolf v. Massman-Johnson, 473 S.W.2d 70, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971), writ
re'd n.r.e., 484 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1972) under Texas law plaintiff entitled to full amount of
damages in third party action), It is to be noted, however, that the injured employee is
generally entitled to only one recovery; therefore, the compensation carrier may be entitled
to subrogation for sums previously paid the employee. See Bedwell v. Riddle, 345 F.2d 183,
183 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (compensation carrier entitled to subrogate payments from
third party judgment).
261. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 1979) (Kentucky law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284,
290-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Georgia law); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 153 (D.D.C.
1965) (Maryland law).
262. The employer-employee relationship is generally determined by the right to hire
and fire, the payment of wages, the carrying of the employee on income and social security
tax rolls, and the furnishing of tools. The most decisive criteria, however, is the right of the
alleged "employer" to control the performance and manner of the servant's work. See
Lemonvich v. Klimoski, 315 F.Supp. 1290, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244
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the major problem areas was the borrowed servant or dual employment situation.'" This situation, however, has become so common
that a definite rule can be stated, as expressed by Arthur Larson:
When a general employer lends an employee to a special employer,
the special employer becomes liable for worker's compensation only
if
(a) the employee has made a contract for hire expressed or
implied, with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and
(c) the special employer has the right to control the details
of the work.
When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for worker's
compensation.
Employment may also be "dual," in the sense that while the
.employee is under contract of hire with two different employers, his activities on behalf of each employer are separate and
can be identified with one employer or the other. When this
separate identification can clearly be made, the particular employer whose work was being done at the time of the injury will
be held exclusively liable.2 "
With the emergence of the conglomerate corporations a new
"employer" question has arisen: whether a parent or subsidiary
corporation is immune from common law liability for its tortious
acts which injure the employees of its sibling, subsidiary, or parent
corporation.' 6" Most courts have found that each corporation is liable for its own separate acts and, therefore, are not a single employers for workers' compensation or third-party actions.""
F.Supp. 151, 155 (D.D.C. 1965); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Goodson, 568
S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
263. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents

Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. Rov. 531, 538-39 (1954).
264. 1 A. LARSON, THE

LAW

OF

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

48 (1976); see Latham v.

Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031, 1038 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); see also Sanchez v. Legett, 489
S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e).
265. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-663 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 290-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031, 1034-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Thomas v.
Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 154-55 (D.D.C. 1965).
266. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
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A classic illustration of the conglomerate problem can be seen in
7 decision. In this case, Mr.
the O'Brien v. Grumman Corporation26
O'Brien died while in the course and scope of his employment
when he crashed in an airplane manufactured by Grumman Corporation.'"8 At the time the plan in question was constructed, Mr.
O'Brien was an employee of the Grumman Corporation, but he had
subsequently been transferred to a subsidiary corporation, Grumman American, his employer at his death.'" Mr. O'Brien's survivor
brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against Grumman Corporation and Grumman Aerospace Corporation alleging
that the plane was improperly designed. 70 The Grumman and
Grumman Aerospace corporations asserted that the plaintiff's
cause of action was barred by the applicable workers' compensation statutes because they were the employers of Mr. O'Brien.?"
The court found that Grumman, Grumman Aerospace, and Grumman American were three separate corporations, and held that an
employee of a subsidiary corporation is not barred by workers'
compensation from suing the subsidiary's parent or sibling
7
corporation.' '

The "employer" question with respect to multicorporation conLatham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031, 1037-1038 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Thomas v. Hycon,
Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 156 (D.D.C. 1965); Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106
(App. Div. 1971); Daisernia v. Co-Operative G.L.F. Holding Corp., 270 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543
(App. Div. 1966); Foley v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct.
1952); Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969). But see
Goldberg v. Context Ind., Inc., 362 So.2d 974, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (per curiam)
(employee of subsidiary corporation barred from suing parent where both corporations are
on a single workmen's compensation policy.).
267. 475 F.Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Georgia law).
268. Id. at 291.
269. See id. at 291. In fact, Mr. O'Brien was an employee of Grumman Corporation
until 1969 when he was transferred to Grumman Aerospace Corporation, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Grumman corporation. Id. at 286, 291. In 1974, Mr. O'Brien was transferred to
the Grumman American Corporation, a partially owned subsidiary of Grumman and Grumman Aerospace Corporations. Id. at 286, 291.
270. See id. at 286.
271. Id. 290-91.
272. See id. at 291-92; see also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 663 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031,
1037-38 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 156 (D.D.C. 1965);
Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (App. Div. 1971); Daisernia v. Co-Operative
G.L.F. Holding Corp., 270 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 1966); Foley v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 S.E.2d
817, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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glomerates is a matter of corporation law rather than workers'
compensation principles.27 3 The workers' compensation statutes
were drafted before the "multi-unit enterprise became the norm in
American economy. 2 7 Therefore, they did not anticipate or confront the conglomerate problem. The courts have determined this
2' 75 If
question under the principles for "piercing the corporate veil.
the corporations are in fact separate, then they are not one employer for worker's compensation purposes.2 7 6 Such questions as
common workers' compensation insurance policies, 277 similar enterprises,278 and similar control or management 79 are irrelevant.2 80
Only if both corporations are so integrated to be considered as one,
273. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980).
274. Id. at 658.
275. See id. at 662; O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see also Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 155 (D.D.C. 1965).
276. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 817, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
277. See O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Latham v.
Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031, 1037 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244
F.Supp. 151, 154 (D.D.C. 1965). But see Goldberg v. Context Ind., Inc. 362 So.2d 974, 974
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (per curiam).
278. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Foley v. New York City Omnibus Corporation, 112 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
279. See Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (App. Div. 1971); Foley v. New
York City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Phillips v. Stowe Mills,
Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
280. In Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1031, 1037 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), the court
explained that common identity, commixture of activity, common insurance, and common
management are factors for determining whether two entitites are in face one employer for
worker's compensation purposes, but that these factors are not conclusive and may be overridden by other factors which establish that the entities are in fact separate. Accord, Boggs
v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836
(1980) (corporations are separate when they can take advantage of dividing business into
separate corporate parts); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(common insurance and fact that employee formerly worked for third party is irrelevant
where entities are separate); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 155 (D.D.C. 1965)
(corporations must be totally integrated to be considered one "employer"); Thomas v.
Maigo Corp., 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (App. Div. 1971) (wholly owned subsidiary controlled,
dominated, and financed by parent still a separate and distinct legal entity); Foley v. New
York City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (same management, officers and business not sufficient to find entities as one "employer"); Phillips v. Stowe Mills,
Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 818, 819-20 (N.C. C.t App. 1969) (separate entities despite same officers, management and work complex).
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may the be held as one single employer protected by workers' compensation."' Thus, if the corporations can take advantage of the
benefits of dividing the business into separate corporate entitites,
then reciprocity requires the courts to uphold the separate identi2 82
ties of the corporations when sued by the injured employee.
Each corporation, therefore, is liable for its own tortious acts, and
only the employing corporation is immune from common law liability under workers' compensation statutes.2 83
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the area of workplace safety, the employee has both prophylactic and compensatory rights. The former are designed to protect
the employee by promoting safe workareas, thereby preventing the
injury in the first place. Prophylactic measures include safety inspections and the abatement of hazardous work conditions through
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Under certain circumstances the employee may also be justified in walking-off the worksite under OSHA, LMRA, or NLRA, in order to avoid or correct
unsafe work conditions. Thus, the employee is no longer forced to
work when confronted with the choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to potential injury or death. The
employee may avoid the hazardous workarea without fear of subsequent discrimination.
Compensatory rights protect the employee by providing economic stability to the injured employee. Under workers' compensation acts the employee need not prove fault in order to retain a
recovery. The system is one of social justice designed to insure that
the injured employee receives sufficient income and medical care to
keep him from destitution. Workers' compensation was also
281. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 151, 155 (D.D.C. 1965). In
Thomas v. Hycon, Inc. the United States District Court for the District of Columbia stated
that a non-employing holding company may be held as a single "employer" with the corporation for which it holds the assets. A holding corporation was held to be separate and,
thereby, liable in a third party action in Daisernia v. Co-Operative G.L.F. Holding Corp.,
270 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 1966).
282. Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 836 (1980).
283. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 661-63 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1980); O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F.Supp. 284, 290-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 819-20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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designed with the intent to promote the correction of hazardous
workareas by the employer. With the passage of time, however, the
egalitarian goals of workers' compensation have slumbered. Workers' compensation was perceived as a swift and certain remedy
which provides moderate compensation without the adversary conflict of the common law tort system. Today, however, the system is
not so swift or certain and de novo appeals embrace the problems
of the common law adversary system. Though workers' compensation provides a needed remedy to those who are remediless at common law, a sense of social justice is lacking for those who are deprived of their common law rights.
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